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Familiness in Future Research
In this monograph, we have argued that familiness and its manifestations such as reciprocal altruism distinguish family firms from their non-family counterparts. A perusal of the literature suggests that the role of familiness is recognised in analyses of family firms, albeit much more in the management literature than in the economics and finance literature. However, the literature requires extension in three different directions -with familiness lying at the heart of these extensions -to facilitate a better understanding of family firms. Specifically, there is a need to better understand the nature of implicit and explicit contracts that characterise a family firm and have reliable proxies for these contracts, especially those within the controlling family. Recall that a firm is characterised by a set of contracts among the stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
In order to achieve this, future research needs to develop along three different lines. First, to supplement the largely heuristic discussions about familiness and intra-family interactions in the strategic management and entrepreneurship literature, there should be more formal modelling of these strategic interactions that help researchers better understand the evolution of the contracts that characterise family firms and the ways in which exogenous factors affect the parameters of these contracts in equilibrium. Second, there should be much greater emphasis on collection of data that go well beyond stylised measures of governance in firms such as ownership patterns and board composition, and focus in depth on the relationships within the families that are in control of the firms. Finally, in the context of the emerging market economies, there should be much more nuanced analyses of family firms that often have the additional characteristic of being part of business groups. We elaborate on these issues in the rest of this chapter.
Modelling familiness
To begin with, a theory of family firms requires careful consideration. At the moment, in the literature, we have models that examine strategic decisions of families with respect to issues such as the continuation of the family firm organisational form (Burkart et al., 2003) . We also have heuristic modelling of the impact of familiness on agency problems within family firms (Lubatkin et al., 2005) and on the competitive advantage of these firms (Habbershon and Williams, 1999) . However, there is very little formal modelling of the intra-family interactions that lie at the heart of familiness, and the implications of those interactions for the relationship of the family with other stakeholders and hence for the firm's strategy and performance.
In Chapter 2 of this monograph, we have introduced a way to model interactions within the family and we have deliberately opted to restrict the modelling to intra-family contracts. There may be alternative ways to model strategic interaction within families without losing sight of altruism and a sense of fairness that characterises relationships within families. Fehr and Schmidt (2000) note that there are a number of different contexts where fairness and altruism matter and economists have modelled the interaction between the different players in these contexts extensively, heuristically or otherwise.
Consider, for example, the possibility that a family firm is a common pool resource for family members, especially from the perspective of amenity potential. Suppose now that the survival of the family firm across generations is critically dependent on the ability of the family members to work collectively to preserve (or sustain) this common pool resource. It would then be interesting to understand how the rules and norms that define the nature of interaction of the family members evolve, how they influence the parameters within which the family collectively interacts with other stakeholders such as nonfamily employees and outside investors and under what conditions there is evolution of rules and norms that are consistent with a high probability of the firm's survival across generations. The economics literature has a long tradition of modelling some of these issues
